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Abstract
An international oligopoly model with unionised and non-unionised firms is constructed
to make predictions about the pattern of international mergers. Applying the method of
endogenous merger formation developed by Horn and Persson [International Journal of
Industrial Organisation 19 (2001) 1213] we find that the equilibrium market structure is
highly dependent on the level of trade costs. The model is further utilised to analyse the
implications of trade liberalisation for unionised labour. A main finding is that, for
sufficiently high levels of trade costs, unionised workers may benefit from a merger
between non-unionised firms, whereas low levels of trade costs make unionised firms highly
‘vulnerable’ to an international merger, which could be detrimental to the union’s ability to
capture oligopoly rents.
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1 . Introduction
Casual observation suggests that the phenomenon of international corporate
mergers seems to be an increasingly important aspect of industrial organisation in
most advanced countries. This view is also supported by empirical facts.
E-mail address: odd.straume@econ.uib.no (O.R. Straume).
0167-7187/02/$ – see front matter   2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0167-7187(02)00093-0
718 O.R. Straume / Int. J. Ind. Organ. 21 (2003) 717–735
According to UNCTAD (2000), the total value of completed cross-border mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) rose from less than $100 billion in 1987 to $720 billion in
1999. Furthermore, in 1999, the share of all M&A, in terms of value, that was
cross-border reached nearly 31 percent. In the same year, international M&A
accounted for over 80 percent of total foreign direct investments (FDI).
From a theoretical point of view, international M&A exhibit some features that
are not fully explained by traditional merger analysis. It is possible to point out at
least two specific aspects that could motivate international mergers. Most well
known is probably the ‘tariff jumping’ motive, which is intuitively appealing: by
forming a multinational firm, the merger participants are able to serve more
markets without incurring any trade costs. This argument has received a lot of
attention in the relatively rich literature on FDI and multinational enterprises
1 2(MNE), but hardly ever in the context of M&A.
Another phenomenon that could motivate international M&A is the existence of
strong trade unions. Lommerud et al. (2001b) suggest that international mergers
could have a potentially strong disciplinary effect on union wage demands. If an
internationally merged firm is able costlessly to shift production between plants in
different markets, trade unions will likely be willing to reduce wage demands in
3
order to prevent production being shifted abroad.
The main purpose of the present paper is to explore these two different motives
4for international horizontal M&A within a single model. Despite the obvious
empirical importance of international merger formation, the amount of theoretical
work on this subject is surprisingly scant. There are, however, a couple of notable
exceptions. Horn and Persson (2001b) explore the incentives for national versus
international mergers in a two-country reciprocal dumping model, whereas Head
and Ries (1997) analyse possible welfare implications of international mergers,
focusing on national versus supranational merger regulation. Neither of these
papers considers the role of trade unions.
As a framework for analysing international M&A, we choose a three-country /
three-firm model with Cournot competition in homogeneous goods and segmented
markets. The model is quite similar to Fisher and Wright (1999), and is basically a
straightforward extension of the reciprocal dumping model introduced by Brander
(1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983). The role of trade unions in international
M&A is introduced by assuming a unionised labour market in one of the countries.
This asymmetric feature of the model also allows us to capture the empirical
1 See Markusen (1995) for an overview of the literature in this field.
2 A noteworthy exception is Horn and Persson (2001b).
3 An empirical example of firms’ use of inter-plant rivalry to discipline trade unions is reported in
Rasmusen (2001, pp. 190–194).
4 The empirical importance of cross-border horizontal merger is confirmed by the fact that about 70
percent of all international M&A in 1999 were horizontal (UNCTAD, 2000).
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observation that labour market structures seem to differ a great deal between
otherwise similar countries.
Analysing the incentives for merger within this framework involves not only
whether or not a merger is profitable, but also what type of merger is most likely
to be carried out. In making such predictions we utilise an approach for
endogenous merger formation developed by Horn and Persson (2001a), which is
based on cooperative game theory. In the case of a symmetric trade cost structure
the model always predicts some type of merger as the equilibrium outcome. We
find that a merger between non-unionised firms is the equilibrium ownership
structure (EOS) if trade costs are above a certain level, whereas a merger
involving the unionised firm is the EOS for sufficiently low levels of trade costs.
An important feature of the model is that the presence of trade costs is a source of
protection for unionised labour in an international oligopoly industry. The size of
the trade costs will thus influence the union’s optimal wage demand as a response
to a merger, and this, in turn, plays a crucial role in determining the pattern of
mergers.
The present model is also well suited to make a contribution to the ongoing
debate about the effects of trade liberalisation for unionised labour. A sizable body
of theoretical studies on this particular topic has emerged during the last decade,
including Driffill and van der Ploeg (1993, 1995), Huizinga (1993), Danthine and
Hunt (1994), Sørensen (1994) and Straume (2002). An important paper in this
respect is Naylor (1998), who analyses the effects of trade liberalisation within the
context of a unionised international duopoly. Naylor finds, perhaps somewhat
counter-intuitively, that from an initial situation of intra-industry trade, a reduction
of trade costs will increase union wages. This result suggests that trade
liberalisation does not necessarily represent a threat to unionised labour. However,
Naylor assumes that a firm can only supply a foreign market through exports.
Considering the empirical importance of FDI this seems to be a rather restrictive
assumption. Lommerud et al. (2001a) relax this assumption by considering
greenfield FDI as an alternative for the unionised firm in an asymmetric
international duopoly. This opens up the, perhaps more intuitively appealing,
possibility that trade liberalisation can be seriously detrimental to unionised
labour.
By considering international M&A, which are empirically the most dominant
form of FDI, as an alternative way to serve a foreign market, the present model
offers some predictions that are more in line with Lommerud et al. Trade
liberalisation can be both beneficial and detrimental to unionised labour, depend-
ing on the equilibrium ownership structure, but for very low levels of trade costs,
international M&A turn out to be an effective way to destroy union power.
Although there are some similar mechanisms at work whether FDI is greenfield
or occurs as M&A, the present paper differs from the analysis in Lommerud et al.
in several ways. For instance, by considering FDI by merger, we are able to
capture an important effect of economic integration and industrial restructuring,
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namely that trade unions can benefit from trade liberalisation through positive
externalities from mergers between non-unionised firms.
The remainder of the paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 presents
the basic ingredients of the model. In Section 3 we derive the optimal union
strategies in each of the possible market structures for very general assumptions
about the trade cost structure. Section 4 outlines the assumptions of the merger
formation process. In Section 5 we derive the equilibrium outcome of the merger
process under the assumption of a symmetric trade cost structure. Some conclud-
ing remarks are offered in Section 6.
2 . Model
Consider an international oligopoly industry with three firms (owners), each
located in a different country (market). We assume that entry to the industry is
restricted, due to some firm-specific ownership advantages of the incumbents. The
firms produce an homogeneous good x under constant returns to labour input.
Output per worker is normalised to unity, so that marginal cost for firm i is given
by the wage w . The industry is assumed to be symmetric in terms of marketi
demand, but not necessarily in terms of trade costs. The trade costs associated with
shipping a unit of x between country i and country j are given by t , and areij
exogenous. Furthermore, we assume that t 5 t . In principle, these trade costs canij ji
include both tariff and non-tariff cost components.
We adopt the segmented market hypothesis, where the firms compete in Cournot
fashion, maximising profits by choosing sales in each market independently.
Output produced in country i and sold in market j is denoted x . Demand isij
assumed to be linear, with the inverse demand function in market i given by
3
p 5 12O x . (1)i ji
j51
In each country there is, in addition, a perfectly competitive sector where
]workers can earn the competitive wage w, assumed to be equal in all countries.
The oligopoly industry is also asymmetric in the sense that the firm in country 1 is
unionised, whereas the other firms are not. The union in country 1 is then able to
capture some of the oligopoly rents by enforcing a wage above the competitive
level. Those workers who are not able to find a ‘good job’ in the imperfectly
]competitive sector are employed in the competitive sector at wage w.
It is reasonable to assume that the trade union cares about both wages and the
available number of good jobs. This is most easily captured by assuming that the
union aims to maximise union rents. Hence, the utility function of the union can be
written as
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]U5 (w 2w)(x 1 x 1 x ), (2)1 11 12 13
where w is the union wage level.1
We then make the simplifying assumption that the union unilaterally chooses the
wage at a stage prior to the Cournot game. This corresponds to the monopoly
union model, which, in the context of the generalised Nash bargaining solution,
amounts to giving the union all the bargaining power and restricting bargaining to
]the wage alone. For simplicity, the competitive wage w will henceforth be set
equal to zero.
We also assume that trade costs are always sufficiently low for intra-industry
trade to occur between non-unionised firms. In the present model this means that
we will restrict attention to the case of t < 1/2.ij
The game is played in three stages. In the first stage the owners decide on the
formation of the firms. In the second stage the union sets the wage for firm 1, and
the firms then engage in Cournot competition in the last stage of the game.
3 . Market structures and union strategies
In making predictions about equilibrium market structures in this model we
want to exclude the possibility of complete monopolisation. This is not only a less
interesting industry structure, but probably also a less relevant structure. It seems
reasonable to assume, as Horn and Persson (2001b) do in a similar type of model,
that a complete monopolisation would not be permitted by competition authorities.
Given the asymmetric nature of the model, we are still left with several possible
market structures that could arise in equilibrium. To introduce some notation
regarding the identification of different market structures, let the set of owners be
given by N5 h1,2,3j. Further, let an ownership structure M be a partition of thei
set N of owners into coalitions. We can then identify three categories of market
structures, with a combined total of four possible ownership structures, which we
choose to denote in the following way:
1. The fully decentralised structure: M 5 h1,2,3j.0
2. A duopoly with a merger between the non-unionised firms: M 5 h1,(21213
3)j.
3. A duopoly with a merger involving the unionised firm: M 5 h(11 2),3j112
and M 5 h(11 3),2j.113
An important feature of each of these market structures is that the pattern of
trade in each structure is endogenously determined by trade union behaviour. By
altering its wage demand, the union is able to induce different patterns of trade
and, as we will see, the optimal wage strategy of the trade union is crucially
dependent on the trade cost structure of the industry.
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3 .1. The decentralised industry structure
In M , the firms are faced with the following problems in the Cournot game:0
max p 5 ( p 2w )x 1 ( p 2w 2 t )x 1 ( p 2w 2 t )x ,1 1 1 11 2 1 12 12 3 1 13 13x ,x ,x11 12 13
] ] ]max p 5 ( p 2w2 t )x 1 ( p 2w)x 1 ( p 2w2 t )x ,2 1 12 21 2 22 3 23 23x ,x ,x21 22 23
] ] ]max p 5 ( p 2w2 t )x 1 ( p 2w2 t )x 1 ( p 2w)x .2 1 13 31 2 23 32 3 33x ,x ,x31 32 33
Because of the cost-disadvantage for the unionised firm, and the potential
differences in trade costs between different countries, the model permits three
alternative trade regimes, endogenously determined by the union’s optimal wage
setting strategies. Since the trade union is assumed to be equally concerned about
both wages and employment there is a fundamental trade-off in deciding upon the
optimal wage demand. The firm will find it profitable to serve a given export
market only if the sum of production costs and trade costs is small enough for
exports to yield a positive profit contribution. Consequently, the higher level of
employment associated with export production can only be obtained at a certain
cost for the trade union, namely by accepting a wage that is low enough for export
production to be profitable for the firm. Obviously, the higher is the trade costs, the
lower is the wage level necessary to induce exports.
If the trade costs associated with exports to countries 2 and 3 are sufficiently
low, the union may optimally set a wage that is low enough for intra-industry trade
to occur between all three markets. In this case, denoted Regime A, the optimal
5
wage is given by
A ]w 5 arg maxhU5 (w 2w)(x 1 x 1 x )j1 1 11 12 13 (3)1 1
] ]5 1 (t 2 t 2 t ).23 12 136 9
If the difference between t and t is sufficiently large, it may be optimal for12 13
the union to set a wage that prohibits exports to the country with highest trade
costs. Assuming t , t , the optimal wage in this regime, denoted Regime B, is12 13
given by
B ]w 5 arg maxhU5 (w 2w)(x 1 x )j1 1 11 12 (4)1 1
] ]5 1 (t 1 t 2 2t ).23 13 126 12
Finally, if both t and t are sufficiently high, the union may optimally set a12 13
wage that induces firm 1 to serve only its home market. We denote this as Regime
C. The optimal wage level is given by
5 A PDF document containing the underlying derivations of all the optimal wage levels reported in
this section can be downloaded from the IJIO Editorial Office website.
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C ]w 5 arg maxhU5 (w 2w)x j1 1 11 (5)1
]5 (11 t 1 t ).12 136
The optimal choice of wage demand strategy for the trade union is based on a
utility comparison of the alternative trade regimes. Using backwards induction, the
union will choose the wage strategy that yields the highest utility in the
corresponding equilibrium outcome. Naturally, this results in different trade
patterns for different levels of trade costs.
3 .2. A merger between the non-unionised firms
In the absence of plant-specific fixed costs, the dominant strategy for the merged
entity is always to retain both production plants post-merger, and serve its
respective ‘home markets’, i.e. markets 2 and 3, by local production. Thus, by
merging, the non-unionised firms are able to serve two markets without incurring
any trade cost outlays. This is the standard ‘tariff jumping’ argument for
establishing a multinational firm. Furthermore, the merged firm will be able to
choose the plant from which to supply market 1 in a way that minimises total
outlays on trade costs. Assuming t , t , the merged firm solves the following12 13
6problem in the Cournot game:
] ] ]max p 5 ( p 2w2 t )x 1 ( p 2w)x 1 ( p 2w)x .m 1 12 m1 2 m2 3 m3x ,x ,xm1 m2 m3
As in the decentralised structure, trade patterns are endogenously determined by
the optimal wage strategy of the union. Since the mechanisms underlying the
optimal choice of wage demand are identical in M and M , the wage0 213
expressions are presented summarily, using the previously established notation:
A 1 1
] ]w 5 2 (t 1 2t ), (6)1 12 134 12
B 1 1
] ]w 5 2 t , (7)1 124 8
C 1 1
] ]w 5 1 t . (8)1 124 4
Comparing the wage outcomes of M and M , there are two aspects of0 213
interest. Firstly, it can be shown that the prohibitive levels of trade costs are higher
in M . This is quite intuitive. A merger implies that the degree of competition in213
each separate market is lower. This means that the profitability of export
production increases for the unionised firm. Thus, for each level of trade costs,
firm 1 can afford higher production costs without having to refrain from exports.
This obviously makes export production more attractive for the trade union, since
6 Subscript ‘m’ refers to the merged firm.
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the employment gain can be obtained at a lower cost, in terms of wage reductions.
Consequently, a merger between non-unionised firms implies an expansion of
Regime A in our model.
Secondly, regarding within-regime comparisons, it is apparent that wages are
higher in M . This is easily seen by a pair-wise comparison of (3)–(6), (4)–(7)213
and (5)–(8). Again, the intuition is relatively straightforward: due to quantities
being strategic substitutes in the Cournot model, the unionised firm will optimally
respond to a merger between non-unionised firms by increasing its output in all
markets. The trade union, having preferences for both employment and wages, will
then capitalise on the firm’s improved competitive position by increasing wages.
Thus, a merger between non-unionised firms in an international oligopoly is
beneficial for unionised workers.
3 .3. A merger involving the unionised firm
This is a market structure consisting of two different ownership structures, M112
and M , which may yield different outcomes with respect to trade patterns,113
depending on the trade cost structure. We can, however, capture all possibilities by
focusing attention on only one of the ownership structures.
Consider a merger between firms 1 and 2. There are now potentially three
different trade regimes to consider. Assume first that t > t . There are now three13 23
possible motivations for such a merger. Firstly, the standard ‘tariff jumping’
argument applies: total outlays on trade costs can be reduced by serving markets 1
]and 2 from the local production plants only. Secondly, since w >w and t > t ,1 13 23
the merged firm’s export market (market 3) can be served entirely from production
in country 2, at the competitive wage level. However, such a merger could also
function as a disciplinary device towards the trade union. In principle, there are
two alternative ways for the merged firm to serve market 1. It could be served by
local production; this implies a saving of trade costs, but possibly at the expense of
higher production costs, because of the unionised labour market. Alternatively, it
could be served by production in country 2. Thus, the wage setting of the union
will be constrained by the merged firm’s threat to move the entire production to
]the low-cost country. More specifically, a union wage in excess of w1 t implies12
that market 1 can be served by the merged firm at a lower cost by shipping the
good from country 2. Subsequently, the union is facing the following problem:
] ]max U5 (w 2w)x subject to w <w1 t . (9)1 m1 1 12w1
]Since the union will never set a wage in excess of w1 t, the merged firm solves
the following problem at stage 2 of the game:
] ]max p 5 ( p 2w )x 1 ( p 2w)x 1 ( p 2w2 t )x .m 1 1 m1 2 m2 3 23 m3x ,x ,xm1 m2 m3
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Using the first-order conditions from profit maximisation, we find the optimal
unconstrained wage in this regime, denoted Regime I, to be
I 1
]w 5 (11 t ). (10)1 134
1
]Consequently, wage setting is constrained if t < (11 t ). We see that the effect12 134
of the merger as a union disciplinary device is crucially dependent on the sizes of
trade costs, both in absolute and relative terms. The higher the trade costs between
the home markets of the merger participants, the more expensive it is for the
merged firm to carry out the threat of moving all production to the low-cost
country.
Now consider the case where t , t . In this case it is not obvious that the13 23
merged firm will choose to serve market 3 from the country with the lowest
production costs. More specifically, if the difference in production costs is lower
than the difference in trade costs the merged firm will optimally choose plant 1 for
export production. If this is the case, then the profit maximisation problem of the
merged firm is now
]max p 5 ( p 2w )x 1 ( p 2w)x 1 ( p 2w 2 t )x .m 1 1 m1 2 m2 3 1 13 m3x ,x ,xm1 m2 m3
Given this, at stage 1 of the game the trade union sets
]w 5 arg maxhU5 (w 2w)(x 1 x )j,1 1 m1 m3
]subject to w <w1 t , (11)1 12
]w <w1 t 2 t .1 23 13
The optimal unconstrained wage in this regime, denoted Regime II, is given by
II 1 1
] ]w 5 2 t . (12)1 134 8
The last possible trade regime may occur if t , t and t is sufficiently low,13 23 12
so that the first constraint in (11) is binding. It may then be optimal for the trade
union to set a wage that is low enough to keep the export production for market 3
in country 1, but not low enough to prevent production for the home market being
shifted to country 2. We call this Regime III. In this case the merged firm solves
the following problem:
] ]max p 5 ( p 2w2 t )x 1 ( p 2w)x 1 ( p 2w 2 t )x .m 1 12 m1 2 m2 3 1 13 m3x ,x ,xm1 m2 m3
The union’s problem is then to set
]w 5 arg maxhU5 (w 2w)x j,1 1 m3 (13)]subject to w <w1 t 2 t ,1 23 13
which yields an optimal unconstrained wage
III 1 1
] ]w 5 2 t . (14)1 134 2
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As this subsection fully demonstrates, a merger involving the unionised firm
may have vastly different effects on union wages, depending on the trade cost
structure of the industry. A main observation, though, is that sufficiently small
trade costs between the home markets of the merger participants turns the merger
into an effective disciplinary device against the trade union. If trade costs in
general are higher, the union is better protected against threats to move production
abroad, and has a freer position to use its power to induce the most preferred trade
regime, from the viewpoint of unionised workers.
We will look more closely into the wage responses of a merger in Section 5,
when making further assumptions about the trade cost structure of the industry.
4 . Endogenous merger formation
In order to make some predictions about merger formation in this model, we
will make use of an approach developed by Horn and Persson (2001a), which
treats the merger process as a cooperative game of coalition formation, where the
players are free to communicate and write binding contracts.
Without going into details about the theoretical foundations, the approach
involves a comparison of any two possible ownership structures M and M , wherei j
M is said to dominate M (M dom M ) if the combined profits of the decisivei j i j
group of owners are larger in M than in M . The decisive group of owners are thei j
owners that are expected to be able to influence whether M will be formed insteadi
of M , and vice versa. We do not allow payments between coalitions, so ownersj
belonging to identical coalitions in the two structures cannot affect whether Mj
will be formed instead of M , but all remaining owners can influence this choicei
7
and are thus decisive.
Consider the ownership structures M and M . In this case, owner 3 stands0 112
alone in both structures, so the decisive owners are the merger participants in
M , i.e. owners 1 and 2. Now consider instead M and M . For M to112 112 213 112
dominate M it is not enough that owners 1 and 2 prefer M over M . If213 112 213
owner 3 is adversely affected by the formation of M , this owner may want to112
persuade owner 2 to form M instead, by offering a large share of the surplus in213
this structure. Thus, all three owners are decisive, and the dominance relation is
determined by a comparison of total industry profits in the two ownership
structures.
Finally, the solution concept is the core. Those structures that are in the core
(i.e. the structures that are undominated) are defined as Equilibrium Ownership
Structures (EOS).
7 See Horn and Persson (2001a) for a formal definition of decisive owners.
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5 . Equilibrium ownership structure when the trade cost structure is
symmetric
In this section we consider the symmetric trade cost structure, where t 5 t forij
all i and j. In other words, the cost of shipping a unit of the commodity between
two countries is the same, irrespective of which two countries we consider. This
assumption considerably decreases the number of potential trade regimes within
each possible market structure.
Let us first consider M and M . From the viewpoint of the unionised firm,0 213
since t 5 t it is obvious that any wage level that makes exports to market 212 13
profitable also makes it profitable to compete in market 3. Consequently, the set of
parameter values defining Regime B is empty. Setting t 5 t 5 t 5 t, a12 13 23
comparison of the relevant utility expressions (reported in Appendix A) reveals
*that the prohibitive level of trade costs, t , above which exports are unprofitable
* *for the unionised firm, is t 5 0.23 in M and t 5 0.27 in M . From (3), (5),0 213
(6) and (8) we find the resulting optimal union wages in these ownership
structures to be
1 1
] ]2 t, if t< 0.23,6 9
w (M )5 (15)H1 0 1
] (11 2t), if t. 0.23,6
1
] (12 t), if t< 0.27,4
w (M )5 (16)H1 213 1
] (11 t), if t. 0.27.4
Considering M and M , these ownership structures are now completely112 113
symmetric. Furthermore, because of trade cost symmetries, the only possible trade
regime in this market structure is Regime I, in which the unionised firm produces
only for its home market.
At this stage of the analysis, a closer look at the wage response to a merger
involving the unionised firm is worthwhile. From (10) we find that the optimal
wage in M is given by112
1
]t, if t< ,3
w (M )5 (17)H1 112 1 1
] ](11 t), if t. .4 3
We see that the union wage is monotonically increasing in t, reflecting the role of
trade costs as a source of protection for unionised workers. Furthermore, if we
make a comparison with wages in Regime A of the decentralised structure, from
(15), we find that wages are higher in M than in M if t. 0.15. Comparing112 0
with Regime C in M , wages are higher in M if t. 1/4. In other words, if trade0 112
costs are not too low, a merger involving the unionised firm will actually raise the
cost of serving market 1 for the merger participants. This is not immediately
obvious, although the economic intuition is clearly traceable. The reason is that the
merger has two effects on union wage setting that move in opposite directions. In
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addition to the aforementioned disciplinary effect, the merger also implies that the
trade union no longer has any incentive to keep wages down in order to promote
export production, since it is always more profitable for the merged firm to serve
its export market from the low-cost country. When trade costs are sufficiently high,
the second effect will dominate, resulting in higher union wages as a response to
the merger.
Having identified the potential trade regimes in each possible market structure,
we are now able to make predictions about the equilibrium ownership structure of
the industry. As a benchmark for comparison, let us first briefly consider the
]special case of competitive labour markets in all countries, i.e. w 5w for all i.i
Lemma 1. 't. 0 such that a merger between any two firms is EOS if t.t.
] ]
Proof. In this completely symmetric version of the model, there are only two
possible market structures: merger and no merger. Thus, a merger is EOS if a
merger between any two firms is profitable for the merger participants. Using
equilibrium profit expressions (A.1) and (A.2) given in Appendix A, we find that
this is the case if t.t5 1/10. h
]
In light of the existing merger literature, this is an obvious result. When trade
costs are zero, each market is characterised by Cournot competition between firms
with identical cost functions. From the now famous result of Salant et al. (1983)
we know that a merger between two out of three firms is unprofitable in such
circumstances, due to the aggressive response from the non-merging firm. As trade
costs increase, though, the ‘tariff jumping’ argument implies that total outlays on
trade costs can be reduced by forming a multinational firm. Thus, if trade costs are
sufficiently high, above t, this effect dominates, and a merger is profitable for the
]
participants.
We know turn to the main model, in which firm 1 is unionised. From a payoff
comparison of the different market structures, the following proposition can be
stated:
ˆ ˆProposition 1. 't . 0 such that M or M is EOS if t[ (0,t ) and M is112 113 213
ˆEOS if t. t.
Proof. For our purposes, M and M are identical ownership structures.112 113
Consider therefore M . When comparing M and M , the decisive group of112 112 0
owners consists of the merger participants in M . Setting t 5 t 5 t 5 t in112 12 13 23
the relevant profit expressions reported in Appendix A, we find that p (M ).m 112
2o p (M ), implying M dom M , if t, 0.17. For t. 0.17 the dominancei51 i 0 112 0
relation is reversed. Likewise, when comparing M and M , the decisive owners213 0
are the merger participants in M . In this case we find that p (M ).213 m 213
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3o p (M ), implying M dom M , for all t. When comparing M and M ,i52 i 0 213 0 112 213
3
all three owners are decisive. In this case we have that o p (M ).i51 i 112
3o p (M ), implying M dom M , if t, 0.12. For t. 0.12 the dominancei51 i 213 112 213
relation is reversed. Hence, M is undominated if t, 0.12 and M is112 213
undominated if t> 0.12. h
A non-trivial observation is the existence of an equilibrium ownership structure
for all levels of trade costs. Furthermore, the equilibrium ownership structure
always involves some type of merger.
From the proof of Proposition 1, we see that a merger between non-unionised
firms is profitable for the merger participants, i.e. M dom M , for all t. Note the213 0
contrast in results compared to the benchmark (Lemma 1), in which a merger is
not profitable for low levels of trade costs. In a Cournot oligopoly we know that
merger profitability depends on how aggressively the non-participants respond to
the merger, and, if products are homogenous, a sufficient degree of cost saving is
needed to make a merger between two firms profitable. In the present model,
considering the market structure M , the non-participant is unionised, and its213
production costs are thus affected by the merger. Ceteris paribus, a merger
between non-unionised firms improves the competitive position of the non-
participant. The trade union optimally responds to this change in market structure
by increasing its wage demand. This increases the cost disadvantage of the
unionised firm, making its response to the merger less aggressive than it would
have been if wages were exogenous. Due to this cost-raising effect, a merger
between the non-unionised firms is profitable even for low levels of t.
A merger involving the unionised firm is profitable for the merger participants,
i.e. M dom M , if trade costs are sufficiently low, t, 0.17. In this case, the112 0
union is in a weak position strategically, and merging with a low-cost firm implies
a considerable cost saving for the merged entity in the form of both saved trade
costs and lower union wages. For higher levels of trade costs, though, the union is
provided with a stronger protection from the threat of moving production abroad,
implying that merger profitability is decreasing in t. Indeed, for t[ (0.15,0.23) or
t. 0.25, the union’s wage setting incentives are such that a merger involving the
unionised firm will lead to higher wages. For t. 0.17 the positive effect of saved
trade costs is more than outweighed by the combined negative effect of higher
wages and an aggressive response from the non-merging firm, making a merger
with the unionised firm unprofitable.
When the fully decentralised ownership structure is dominated by both types of
merger, the EOS is determined by a comparison of total industry profits. For low
levels of trade costs, a merger involving the unionised firm is the equilibrium
ownership structure. When t is low, union workers are poorly protected by trade
costs, and a merger with a low-cost firm is an effective way to reduce union rents,
and thereby increase industry profits. Due to this effect, a merger involving the
unionised firm yields a larger contribution in terms of total industry profits.
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However, for higher levels of trade costs, t. 0.12, a merger between the
non-unionised firms is the equilibrium ownership structure.
5 .1. Trade liberalisation and union wages
By allowing for endogenous merger formation in a model of international
oligopoly with unionised and non-unionised firms, the effect of trade liberalisation
on union wages will naturally differ from the more traditional models of this kind.
In these types of models it seems reasonable to interpret trade liberalisation, or
8
economic integration, as a (marginal) reduction of trade costs. Considering the
fully decentralised structure as a benchmark, we can state the following lemma.
Lemma 2.
≠w (M )1 0
]]] *, (. )0 if t, (. )t (M ).0≠t
Proof. Setting t 5 t 5 t 5 t, the proof follows immediately from (15). h12 13 23
*If trade costs are initially relatively low, t, t (M )5 0.23, we have a Naylor-0
type situation, in which a reduction in trade costs would lead to higher wages.
Although our model setup is somewhat different from Naylor (1998), the general
message is the same: in an international oligopoly, if trade costs are initially low
enough for export production to be profitable for a unionised firm, a further
reduction of trade costs will result in higher union wages. The reason is that a
reduction in t will lead to an increased degree of competition both in the home
market and in the export market(s), implying that the total output of the unionised
firm goes up. A union with preferences for both employment and wages will prefer
to convert some of this employment increase into higher wages.
*If, on the other hand, trade costs are initially relatively high, t. t (M ), results0
are reversed. In this case, export production is not profitable for the high-cost firm,
and a marginal reduction of trade costs implies a higher degree of import
competition in the unionised country. In order to soften the subsequent reduction
in employment, the trade union optimally responds by reducing its wage demands.
Let equilibrium wages in our model with endogenous merger formation be
*denoted w . We have already seen that a merger between the non-unionised firms
leads to an increase in union wages within each trade regime, and that a merger
involving the unionised firm leads to an increase in wages if t[ (0.15,0.23) or
8 In line with our interpretation of trade costs, trade liberalisation should be thought of as any
measures taken to reduce the costs of trade, including reduced tariffs, improved quality of infrastructure
or reduced bureaucratic barriers to trade.
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t. 0.25. Regarding the effect on union wages of trade liberalisation, the following
proposition can be stated:
ˆ ˆ* * * *Proposition 2. ≠w /≠t. 0 if t, t, ≠w /≠t, 0 if t[ (t,t (M )) and ≠w /≠t.213
*0 if t. t (M ).213
Proof. Using Proposition 2, the result follows immediately from (16) and
(17). h
ˆA merger between the non-unionised firms is the EOS for t. t, and the
mechanisms underlying the union’s response to trade liberalisation are similar to
the model without merger. Trade liberalisation leads to an increase (decrease) in
*union wages if t is initially below (above) the prohibitive level t (M )5 0.27.213
However, for low levels of trade costs the model predicts that the unionised firm
ˆwill merge, causing a downward pressure on union wages. For t, t union wage
setting is constrained, implying that a reduction in trade costs forces the union to
ˆlower its wage demands. Thus, for t, t, trade liberalisation leads to a decrease in
union wages. The results are illustrated in Fig. 1.
The model is rather stylised, so one should interpret the results with some care.
Nevertheless, the general implications of trade liberalisation for unionised labour
predicted by the model are the following: for higher levels of trade costs there will
be a tendency towards international merger between non-unionised firms, and this
will clearly benefit unionised labour (and unionised firms), since international
competition is reduced. For lower levels of t, however, unionised firms are
‘vulnerable’ to international mergers, because this type of merger is more effective
as a disciplinary device towards union wage demands when trade costs are low.
This is of course detrimental to union workers. If we look at union utility, it turns
Fig. 1. Equilibrium union wages with (thick curve) and without (thin curve) endogenous merger
formation.
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out that some intermediate level of protection, where t is low enough to induce
export production, but just high enough to prevent a merger, is the most preferable
from the viewpoint of union workers.
6 . Concluding remarks
Due to the complexities involved in capturing the strategic cross-country and
cross-market interactions of firms in an international oligopoly industry, generality
is hard to obtain. Nevertheless, even the rather stylised model of this paper
produces some results and implications that are intuitively quite appealing.
The general idea explored in the paper is that, in an international oligopoly with
unionised and non-unionised firms, different levels of trade costs create different
incentives for international M&A. In particular, the effects of mergers as a
disciplinary device towards trade unions are highly dependent on how strongly
unions are protected by trade costs. The present model suggests that, for low levels
of trade costs, there will be a tendency towards international mergers involving
unionised firms.
Due to the obvious importance of international M&A as an empirical phenom-
enon, it is tempting to suggest that any comprehensive analysis of the effects of
trade liberalisation on union wages in an international oligopoly industry should
somehow include this possibility. Without claiming comprehensiveness, the
present model nevertheless provides some interesting implications of trade
liberalisation for unionised labour. For relatively high values of trade costs, the
model predicts a tendency towards merger between non-unionised firms, which is
beneficial for union workers, whereas low levels of trade costs make unionised
firms increasingly ‘vulnerable’ to international M&A.
Although international M&A is an interesting phenomenon from a welfare point
of view, a formal welfare analysis is deliberately omitted from the paper. One
reason is that the dominance relation approach to endogenous merger formation
does not specify how profits are divided between firms in the different ownership
structures. This does not make the model perfectly suited for welfare analysis at
country level, which is arguably the most interesting angle of incidence.
Finally, it is important to emphasise that the extent to which trade unions are
‘protected’ by trade costs is crucially dependent on how international product
market competition is modelled. The literature suggests two main classes of
models in this field: models of reciprocal trade, in the tradition of Brander (1981)
and Brander and Krugman (1983), and ‘third-market’ models, in the tradition of
Brander and Spencer (1985). ‘Third-market’ models are often interpreted as
international competition in an integrated ‘world market’ (see, e.g., Corneo, 1995;
Yang, 1995). If we use the second approach, and assume that the firms are
competing in an integrated world market, possibly with associated trade costs, it
can easily be shown that the EOS always involves a merger with the unionised
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firm. Thus, the existence of a ‘home market’ that to a certain degree is protected
by trade costs is a necessary source of union power in our model.
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A ppendix A. Equilibrium profits and union utility for symmetric trade
costs
Solving the two-stage game by backwards induction, and setting t 5 t, wei, j
derive the following expressions for equilibrium profits and union utility in each
market structure.
 Competitive labour markets
M :0
21
]p 5 (11 4(t1 t )). (A.1)i 16
M :112
21
]p 5 (11 8t2 2t ),m 9 (A.2)21
]p 5 (12 10t1 7t ).3 9
 Unionised labour market in country 1
M —Regime A:0
23 1 11
] ] ]p 5 2 t1 t ,1 64 16 16
249 49 337
] ] ]p 5p 5 2 t1 t , (A.3)2 3 192 144 432
21
]U5 (32 2t) .144
M —Regime C:0
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21
]p 5 (11 2t) ,1 64
259 67 35
] ] ]p 5p 5 2 t1 t , (A.4)2 3 192 144 48
21
]U5 (11 2t) .48
M —Regime A:213
21 1 3
] ] ]p 5 2 t1 t ,1 12 6 4
225 5 11
] ] ]p 5 2 t1 t , (A.5)m 48 24 16
21
]U5 (12 t) .8
M —Regime C:213
21
]p 5 (11 t) ,1 36
297 35 49
] ] ]p 5 2 t1 t , (A.6)m 144 72 144
21
]U5 (11 t) .24
M :112
21 4 2 1
] ] ] ]2 t1 t , if t, ,3 9 3 3
p 5Hm 21 1 7 1
] ] ] ]2 t1 t , if t> ,4 6 12 3
21 4 2 1
] ] ] ]2 t1 t , if t, ,3 9 3 3 (A.7)p 5H3 219 17 43 1
] ] ] ]2 t1 t , if t> ,48 24 48 3
t 1
] ](12 t), if t, ,3 3U5 2H 1 1
] ](11 t) , if t> .24 3
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